International humanitarian law places certain obligations on, or gives rights to, a "party to the conflict" or "parties to the conflict". Although nearly 200 provisions of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols include such a phrase, none of these instruments defines this term. At the same time, even though terrorist groups or organisations may be using armed force during armed conflicts, States appear reluctant to recognise such groups as parties to a conflict. The present contribution explains what is to be understood as parties to the conflict for each of the two types of armed conflict under international humanitarian law, namely international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, and discusses whether, or to what extent, (alleged) terrorist organisations can qualify as such parties. This contribution further critically assesses the findings in recent Belgian case law that various armed actors involved in the Syrian conflict are not considered to be parties to the said conflict.
Delineating "terrorist organisations"
While the so-called "Global War on Terror" 12 may not have been an armed conflict as such, 13 because "terror" or "terrorism" are descriptions of methods rather than a distinct entity capable of being a party to a conflict, 14 IHL and terrorism are not mutually exclusive; and IHL has relevance to terrorism. Acts or measures of terrorism 15 and the spreading terror among the civilian population 16 are explicitly prohibited under IHL. The Bosnian war provides a good example that such conduct may also be resorted to by regular armed forces.
Generals Galić and Milošević of the Bosnian Serb Army (Vojska Republike Srpske) were convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for having terrorised the population of Sarajevo during the siege of that city between 1992 and 1996. 17 Moreover, one of the most well-known rebel groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or Tamil Tigers, who fought in the Sri Lankan Civil War, 18 has been 12 Whilst the term "Global War on Terror" was not used by the Obama administration, the newer 'version' ("Overseas Contingency Operations") still involved the use of armed force against (suspected) Al-Qaida operatives in various countries (other than Afghanistan). 13 Part of the military engagements that occured during the Global War on Terror did amount to armed conflict, for example, the fighting in Afghanistan (see further below at section 3 15 Article 33 GC IV and Article 4(2)(d) AP II. 16 Acts aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population are prohibited both in international and noninternational armed conflicts. Using the same language, both the Additional Protocols state that "[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited" (Article 51(2) AP I and Article 13(2) AP II). See also Rule 2 and the underlying practice of the study on customary international humanitarian law, carried out and updated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1 and 2 (Cambridge University Press 2005), an updated version is available at https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home. 17 18 The LTTE was an organised rebel force that fought the Sri Lankan government in a lengthy non-international armed conflict until it was defeated by the Sri Lankan government forces in 2009. 'credited' for having invented the suicide bomb-belt 19 and reportedly used this device against both military and civilian objects. 20 In IHL, armed non-State actors, such as the Tamil Tigers, are commonly referred to as (organised) armed groups, or armed opposition groups. When referring to terrorist entities, international law instruments use the terms "organisations" 21 as well as "groups". 22 National instruments, at least those of English speaking countries, such as the United States' list of "Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations", appear to slightly favour the wording "terrorist organisation", 23 but also refer to "terrorist groups" 24 and "terrorist entities". 25 Whatever the name given, it is clear that not every actor designated as a terrorist organisation is an organised armed group in the sense of IHL. Besides lacking the required level of organisation, 26 many terrorist organisations are not involved in, 27 or linked to an armed conflict. 28 Also, such organisations or groups can be very small and their violence may not reach the intensity threshold of non-international armed conflict. 29 However, while many terrorist organisations may not use armed violence or resort to violent means in order to control territory or to overcome an enemy, under IHL the motivation of organised armed groups involved in armed violence "is not a criterion for determining the existence of an armed conflict". 30 What is relevant are the factual criteria for the existence of an armed 19 See Federal Bureau of Investigations, 'Taming the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the U.S.' (10 January 2008) https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008. 20 See, for example, the Report of the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (31 March 2011), according to which "[t]he LTTE pioneered modern suicide bombing, which it used against military, political and civilian targets" (para. 32). 21 See, for example, the Preamble and Article 18 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999), which refers to "terrorist organizations". 22 See the European Union's Council common position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP), which established a list of "persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts" (Article 1 and Annex). 23 Besides the abovementioned list of the Unites States, see also the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000; the Division 102 of the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995, and the accompanying "Protocol for listing terrorist organisations"; the Kenyan Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012. 24 For example, New Zealand Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 25 See the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act 2001. 26 See below at Section 4 for a discussion on the required level of organisation. 27 Canada, for example, (still) lists the Canadian organisation called the World Tamil Movement as a terrorist entity. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx. 28 The Basque separatist movement Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), for example, has been listed as a terrorist organisation by Spain and the United States, while the European Union lists the Dutch Hofstadgroep as such. However, there are no non-international armed conflicts taking place in Spain and the Netherlands, respectively. 29 The existence of a non-international armed conflict requires resort to, or use of, violence by at least two sides. For a discussion about when the so-called lower threshold of non-international armed conflict reached (meaning that the situation goes beyond mere internal disturbances), see below at Section 4. 30 ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts: Report in preparation of the 31 nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC, Geneva 2011) p. 11. conflict. Once these factual criteria are met, an armed conflict exists and an armed entity can fight as part of it, provided it meets the minimum criteria discussed below, irrespective of a designation as terrorist organisation. Moreover, the labeling of a group as a terrorist organisation is often done for political reasons, 31 and increasingly so since 11 September 2011. 32 The acts and operations carried out by organised armed groups involved in (mostly) non-international armed conflict are often referred to as terrorist acts, because they are in opposition to a government and such groups often resort to guerilla tactics. 33 Indeed, sometimes terrorism may be "more appropriately regarded as but one method of conducting hostilities rather than as a type of warfare in itself". 34 The focus of the present contribution is not on armed groups that are generally recognised as fighting in opposition to their governments in non-international armed conflicts of a civil war-like nature, and are or were at the same time listed as terrorist organisations, such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. 35 Instead, the emphasis is on groups that are broadly recognised a being terrorist organisations, such as Al-Qaida, but that also use armed violence in situations that may be regarded as armed conflicts. In addition, while the definition of a terrorist organisation, such as the one contained in the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act of 2000, 36 generally includes those organisations that prepare for, promote, encourage or finance terrorism, while not themselves using force, 37 the present contribution only considers those organisations that actually engage in violent acts that could be qualified as terrorism. 31 See Helen Duffy, The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law (2 nd ed., Cambridge University Press 2015) p. 346. Similarly, there may be political reasons not to designate an armed group as a terrorist organisation. The United States' government, for example, claimed in 2015 that the Taliban was not a terrorist organisation in order not to be criticised for "negotiating with terrorists" when it was discussing prisoner swaps with the Afghan Taliban (see, for example, Jessica Chasmar, "Taliban not a terrorist group, White House deputy press secretary says", The Washington Times (28 January 2015) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/28/white-house-spokesman-suggests-taliban-is-not-a-te/). 32 Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi, International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2011) p. 100. 33 In this regard, the ICRC stresses that "acts that are not prohibited by IHL -such as attacks against military objectives or against individuals not entitled to protection against direct attacks -should not be labelled 'terrorist' at the international or domestic levels". ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts: Report in preparation of the 32 nd 36 Section 3(2) specifies that "an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it (a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism". 37 See also the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code 1995, which lists terrorist organisations in Division 102.1 as "an organisation that is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act".
Having set out the scope of the entities that will be analysed, the discussion now turns to when such entities can qualify as parties to an armed conflict. Given the binary system of IHL, which recognises only two types of armed conflict (international and non-international ones), 38 this question has to be answered in two parts. The next section will discuss international armed conflict situations.
International armed conflicts
Pursuant to Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Common Article 2), the conventions apply in "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them [and] […] all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance". Based on this provision, international armed conflicts are those that oppose "High Contracting
Parties" -which refers to States -and occur when one or more States have recourse to armed force against one or more other States, irrespective of the reasons of this confrontation, or whether these States concerned acknowledge that such a conflict is taking place. 39 Moreover, the intensity of such armed confrontation is irrelevant when it comes to armed clashes between two States. 40 38 E.g., ICRC, How is the term "Armed Conflict" defined in international humanitarian law? (Opinion Paper, ICRC, Geneva 2008) p. 1. Available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armedconflict.pdf. 39 See, for example, Jann K Kleffner, 'Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law' in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (3 rd ed., Oxford University Press 2013) pp 43-46; ICRC 2008 (n 38), p. 1; and ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Cambridge University Press, 2016), para. 213. Although States need not acknowledge that the factual situation gives rise to an international armed conflict for IHL to be applicable, the expression of States on fighting has become more relevant given the fact that, as is now also acknowledged by the ICRC, armed confrontations between a State and a non-State actor on the territory of a third State qualify as international armed conflicts in case the third State does not consent to the use of armed force against the non-State actor concerned. See further below and ibid., , paras 261 and further. 40 This was confirmed by, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, when considering whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over the alleged crimes in the Tadić case, famously defined the concept "armed conflict", as part of which it held that an international armed conflict "exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States" (emphasis added). ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995 ("Tadić Jurisdiction Decision"), para. 70. The second part of the Appeals Chamber definition addressed non-international armed conflicts: "[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State" (emphasis added). See also Kleffner (n 39), p. 43; and ICRC 2016 (n 39), paras 236-244. It therefore appears that the parties to international armed conflicts can only be States, 41 but the situation is more nuanced. Although it should be noted that the United States, for example, uses the concept of "State Sponsors of Terrorism", 42 the present analysis focuses on the question whether terrorist organisations, which generally would be non-State actors, can be a party to such conflicts. 43 The question what makes up a State has to be answered with reference to general public international law. 44 However, as will be shown next, in addition to States, parties to international armed conflicts can also be entities with State-like status under IHL. In the following three situations, a terrorist organisation could attain such status and be a party to an international armed conflict.
First, a terrorist organisation, or its armed wing, may make up the armed forces of a State. The obvious example in this regard is the Taliban, which was the government of Afghanistan during the start and -at least the first phase of -the international armed conflict that took place in 2001 and 2002 between the coalition led by the United States and Afghanistan. However, it was also regarded as a terrorist organisation. 45 It was aligned with, and arguably fought together with, Al Qaeda, 46 which is at the time "could be identified as an organized group with clear leadership and even a fixed location, including a trainings camp and headquarters". 47 At the same time it was the most notorious terrorist organisation in the 41 See also Bianchi and Naqvi (n 32), p. 26. 42 The US Department of State, for example, lists Iran, Sudan and Syria as such. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. If engaged in an armed conflict with other States, such States sponsors would, of course, be parties to these international armed conflicts. 43 International organisations with international legal personality, such as the United Nations, can be party to an international armed conflict (see Kleffner (n 39), p. 53). However, in case of organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is generally considered that the troop contributing countries would be the parties to the conflict concerned. See, for example, Marten Zwanenburg, 'International organisations vs troops contributing countries: which should be considered as the party to an armed conflict during peace operations?' in Stéphane Kolanowski (ed), Proceedings of the Bruges Colloquium -International Organisations' Involvement in Peace Operations: Applicable Legal Framework and the Issue of Responsibility (College of Europe/ICRC, Bruges 2011) pp 23-28. 44 world. 48 It has been argued that Al Qaeda was a party to that same international armed conflict, 49 but the situation with organised armed groups is not straightforward, 50 as will be shown below.
A similar situation would arise if Hezbollah, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation but was also represented in the Lebanese parliament, 51 were to become the government of Lebanon and Lebanon would subsequently be engaged in an armed conflict with another State. It is clear, however, that such situations are exceptional.
The second situation where a terrorist organisation can be a party to an international armed conflict arises if a group, which is likely to be designated by the government concerned as a terrorist group, 52 is fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination. Pursuant to Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, such situations are international armed conflict. 53 It is important to note, however, that for Article 1(4) to be applicable, the State concerned has to be a party to Additional Protocol I. In practice, this has rarely been the case, precisely because States that faced a situation that could potentially qualify as "wars of national liberation" (and thus fall under Article 1(4)) wished to avoid elevating the conflict within their borders to an international level. 54 The Palestine Liberation Organization, for example, 48 The United Nations sanctions regime against Al-Qaida was established in UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (19 October 1999) and has been updated and continued since. In fact, a special United Nations subsidiary body exists that is called the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (see https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/al-qaida-sanctions-committee). 49 For example, Mohamedou (n 47). 50 The States whose situations the drafters specifically had in mind when agreeing upon Article 1(4), e.g. the Apartheid in South Africa and the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the Westbank, did not ratify the protocol precisely fort hat reason (Note: Israel had further reason). Only after the Apartheid ended, South Africa ratified Additional Protocol I. States such as Sri Lanka and the Philippines never ratified the protocol out of fear that the armed opposition in these countries would call upon Article 1(4). Similarly, the stated reason for the United States not to ratify the protocol was this contentious provision of the "ill-defined concept" of "wars of national liberation", averring that "we must not, and need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law": applicable to it, 61 but if the view that the situation transforms into an international armed conflict is followed, the group that has been recognised as a belligerent would be a party to an international armed conflict. Although recognition of belligerency is a rare phenomenon and has not occurred for many years, the doctrine of belligerency is still valid and can be applied. 62 The debate that arose in the past as to whether Colombia had recognised the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 63 designated by many as a terrorist organisation 64 and until the recent peace agreement engaged in a conflict with the government that lasted over 50 years, as a belligerent 65 shows that this possibility is not entirely unrealistic. Indeed, this example demonstrates that it is "premature" to consider that such recognitions could no longer take place. 66 Therefore, while recognition of belligerency of a terrorist organisation is unlikely to take place, if it were to be done, it would make the organisation a party to an international armed conflict.
In addition to the previous three situations, terrorist organisations would appear to be parties to international armed conflicts if the view is taken that the transnational or extraterritorial fighting between an organised armed group and a foreign State that takes place without the consent of the State on whose territory the group resides, is to be classified as such a conflict. A minority of academics suggests that this is the case, 67 but -importantly -the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in its updated commentaries to the does not consent to a terrorist organisation being attacked on its territory, an international armed conflict would exist between the intervening foreign State and the host State. The fighting between the foreign State and the group would be part of that same conflict, but as the organisation is not part of the host State (in a manner as discussed below), it appears to be a separate party to the conflict. Support for this position can be found in the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which was viewed as having been international by both Israel and Lebanon. 69 The UN Commission of Inquiry that investigated the conflict concluded that the "hostilities were in actual fact and in the main only between the [Israel Defence Forces]
and Hezbollah. The fact that the Lebanese Armed Forces did not take an active part in them neither denies the character of the conflict as a legally cognizable international armed conflict, nor does it negate that Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah were parties to it". 70
Part of a party?
Although the above shows that the cases where a terrorist organisation would itself be a party to an international armed conflict are rare, 71 it may be more common for such an organisation to be qualified as a part of a party. This would occur when the group can be characterised as a "militia or volunteer corp" that forms part of the armed forces of a State. 72 During the drafting process of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, it was suggested to delete the reference to militias or volunteer corps, as they would be covered by the expression "armed forces". However, as certain countries at the time still had militias and volunteer corps that formed part of the armed forces, but were "quite distinct from the army", the reference was retained. 73 71 At least, if one follows the majority academic view. 72 Article 4(1)(A) GC III states that "[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces" qualify as prisoners of war once fallen into the power of the enemy. 73 82 Article 4(A)(2) GC III sets out these following conditions that militias or volunteer corps have to fulfil: a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209305 
Non-international armed conflicts
Non-international armed conflicts differ enormously, ranging from those that resemble conventional warfare, similar to international armed conflicts, to conflicts that are rather unstructured. The parties to non-international armed conflicts -whether States or organised armed groups -therefore also vary a lot in character. 87 83 95 The requirement that for a non-international armed conflict to exist these two criteria must be fulfilled has been widely accepted as reflecting custom. 96 The ICTY used, in its own words, the criteria of intensity and organisation as a way to distinguish an armed conflict "from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities". 97 However, that statement should not be taken as meaning that terrorist activities cannot be part of an armed conflict. Instead, as later clarified by the ICTY in Boškoski, it merely means that "certain terrorist activities committed in peace time, would not be covered by Common Article 3". 98
As to the intensity requirement, it has been argued by defence teams before the ICTY that terrorist acts should not be counted for the assessment of the existence of an armed conflict. In Boškoski, the Trial Chamber correctly stated that "terrorist acts may be constitutive of protracted violence" and that "while isolated acts of terrorism may not reach the threshold of armed conflict, when there is protracted violence of this type, especially where they require the engagement of the armed forces in hostilities, such acts are relevant to assessing the level of intensity with regard to the existence of an armed conflict." 99
The organisation requirement
The concept of "party to an armed conflict" presupposes a minimum level of organisation identified factors with various indicators that can be grouped together as follows: i) the existence of a command structure, which would be exemplified by having headquarters, a general staff or high command, identifiable ranks and positions, internal regulations, the issuing of political statements or communiqués, and the use of spokespersons; ii) the military (operational) capacity of the armed group, which would be shown, for example, by the ability to define a unified military strategy, the use military tactics, the ability to carry out (large scale or coordinated) operations, the control of territory, and having a territorial division into zones of responsibility; iii) the logistical capacity of the armed group, for which indicators would be that a supply chain exists that allows the group to gain access to weapons and other military equipment, the group's ability to move troops around and to recruit and train personnel; iv) the existence of an internal disciplinary system and the ability to implement IHL by having disciplinary rules or mechanisms in place; v) the group's ability to speak with one voice, indicated, for example, by the capacity of the leadership to act on behalf of its members in political negotiations and to conclude cease-fire agreements. 102
It is important to note that these factors are only indicative and need not all be fulfilled, or all apply, at the same time. In addition, it is not determinative for the existence of a non-international armed conflict whether a group pursues legitimate or criminal aims. 103 One may nonetheless wonder whether a terrorist organisation that completely refrains from attacking government structures or members of the armed forces and only targets civilians can qualify as a party. In this regard, the general reluctance to classify the Mexican drug- 100 [a]t least one of these, the territory, but more often two, the territory and the population, are made object of attack". challenge the armed group's control over part of its territory, for example, because the armed group is considered too strong to be ousted militarily. 108
One or more armed conflicts?
Once the threshold for the existence of a non-international armed conflict has been fulfilled, it may be questioned whether other armed actors that are involved in the conflict but are not themselves sufficiently organised, also qualify as parties. The answer to this question depends on the approach one takes with respect to the possibility of parallel non-international armed conflicts existing alongside each other. Is the fighting in Syria, for example, one noninternational armed conflict with many different parties? Or are there many separate noninternational armed conflicts with the Syrian government (and Russia) on one side and one organised armed group on the other, as well as certain non-international armed conflicts between some of these armed groups themselves? The latter approach 109 would mean that groups that do not fulfill the organisation requirement cannot be regarded as parties to a noninternational armed conflict. Yet, applying the former approach, 110 such participating groups can all be parties; and, arguably, at least in the view of the present author, be considered as "parties" even if they themselves are not sufficiently organised to fulfil the non-international armed conflict threshold criterion. 111
A further question arises with regards to so-called "associated" armed forces. 112 The US, for example, has declared a number of organisations that are also listed as terrorist 108 112 The international armed conflict concept of "belonging to" and law of neutrality concept of "co-belligerency" do not exist in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Interestingly, however, individuals or groups around the world conducting terrorist acts appear to pledge allegiance to ISIS, for example, and ISIS appears to accept these links by claiming the attacks carried out by these persons.
Rogier Bartels, 'When do terrorist organisations qualify as "parties to an armed conflict" under international humanitarian law?', Military Law and Law of War Review (forthcoming) groups to be "associated forces" of Al-Qaeda. 113 Do these form one and the same party to an armed conflict, or only if they share the same Command and Control structure? Or do such associated groups constitute separate parties to the same conflict? It has recently been submitted that for armed groups to be regarded as "co-belligerents", more is required than for two States to qualify as such during an international armed conflict. Despite being separate groups, they should, for example, be "coordinating their operations against the State (e.g., by dividing up zones of activity or by coordinating the time and place of attacks in order to maximize their effect)." 114 Moreover, providing material support for the commission of hostilities, which has been proposed as the test to determine whether third States supporting the government-side in an ongoing non-international armed conflict qualify as parties, 115 could lead to a determination that the new group has become a party to the conflict. However, in the context of armed groups, it is more appropriate to require actual participation in the hostilities by each group, 116 to avoid members of such groups to be considered as lawful targets too easily. When someone is a member of an organised armed group, including terrorist organisations will be discussed next.
Membership of a party
The So when a terrorist organisation is party to a non-international armed conflict, which persons can be considered as members of such a group? Common Article 3 refers to "members of armed forces", which relates to the armed forces of both States and non-State actors. 118 One of the approaches to determine who can be targeted is to look at the membership of an organised armed group. Membership for IHL (and thus: whether someone may be targeted) should therefore not be interpreted too widely. In this regard, it is important to note that the membership of a terrorist organisation for the purposes of sanction lists, which also include persons engaging in fundraising, for example, is very different and much broader than the persons who may be targeted in accordance with IHL. In order to avoid insertion of the political aspects surrounding the qualification of terrorism, for the purpose of establishing IHL-membership, one must therefore resort to the same standard as for membership to an organised armed group. Generally, this will mean that those who are not part of the armed wing of an entity referred to as a terrorist organisation are not targetable "members" for IHL purposes. Dissecting the full debate on direct participation in hostilities and membership goes beyond the scope of the present article, but it suffices to say that different views exist as to the scope of IHL-membership and the related loss of protection against targeting. 119 The present author favours the "functional membership" approach.
Applying this standard would mean that persons who fulfill a "continuous combat function"
in a terrorist organisation that qualifies as an organised armed group, lose their protection as a civilian. They are therefore subject to attack on a continuous basis -until such time as they cease their combat function. 120
Before moving to the last section, it must be highlighted that there is a difference between being a party to an armed conflict and being bound by IHL; or falling within the law's scope of application. It is true that Common Article 3 states only that "each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply" the minimum rules, but those groups or persons not The nexus requirement in international criminal law is used to determine whether certain conduct can qualify as a war crime, but in effect, what is being determined is whether IHL was applicable to the conduct, as that has to be the case for provisions of this body of law to be violated. In turn, the nexus requirement, normally used to assess whether certain prohibited conduct is sufficiently associated with an armed to qualify as a war crime, and as set out by the ICTY in Kunarac, for example, can also be used to assess the personal scope of IHL. 123
Belgian case law on "armed forces involved in armed conflict"
At the end of this contribution, it is appropriate to show that the above discussion is not merely a theoretical exercise and to highlight the impact incorrect application of IHL terms, such as party to an armed conflict, may have on related issues.
Foreign fighter cases concerning Al Nusra Front and ISIS
In Belgium, domestic courts recently were seised of a number of criminal cases dealing with the phenomenon of "foreign fighters", that is persons who have travelled to Syria or elsewhere, to join or otherwise support groups fighting against the government or other armed groups. In the first case of these cases, as with any other Belgian case concerning a situation of armed conflict, the Belgian judges had to consider whether two groups in Syria that qualified as terrorist groups under Belgian law at the same time constituted "armed forces engaged in an armed conflict", because the Belgian Criminal Code includes a clause that excludes the application of Belgian criminal law over "acts of armed forces during an 121 The ICRC explains that "[w]hile IHL is binding on non-State actors, this is only the case insofar as they are parties to an armed conflict (namely, organized armed groups . The ICC has also adopted these criteria to establish the requisite nexus to the armed conflict for certain conduct to qualify as a war crime.
armed conflict". 124 In determining whether the groups concerned qualified as "armed forces"
for the purposes of this exclusion clause, the Belgian courts made an assessment similar to analysing whether these groups were parties to a (non-international) armed conflict in Syria.
Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Antwerp, 125 whose findings on this issue were confirmed by the Court of Cassation in Brussels, 126 answered the aforementioned question by considering whether the groups concerned fulfilled the organisation requirement, and did so by looking at the factors as set out by the ICTY. 127 The analysis therefore started with the correct approach, by applying the correct legal framework, but the findings made by the Belgian courts are highly questionable in this first case, while in some later cases, including one dealing with ISIS, they were plainly wrong.
One of these alleged groups of the first case was Jahbat Al Nusra, or the Al Nusra The Court of Appeal further found that besides "terrorist acts", the group carried out armed "organised armed group" for the purposes of IHL. 132 Consequently, if this ruling were to be correct, Al Nusra Front was not a party to a non-international armed conflict in Syria in 2014-15. The judgment is problematic because it distorts the relevant applicable law, by on the one hand relying on the method used by the international courts and tribunals to determine whether the organisation criterion for the existence of a non-international armed conflict is
fulfilled, yet on the other hand requiring a higher threshold than these international institutions 133 and stressing mainly subjective notions, such as whether the groups concerned were terrorist groups, and the alleged absence of a political goal for or purpose of the fighting. 134 Furthermore, the ruling is problematic because it appears to reject the application of IHL to such cases of armed violence. If the Belgian case law were to be applied in a different context, when considering whether war crimes were committed, for example, the unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the scope of application of IHL would risk creating impunity and may also negatively affect IHL's protective reach.
The present author does not advocate the lowering of the non-international armed conflict threshold, but the conclusion that a group like Al Nusra Front was not a party to such a conflict in Syria is incorrect and must be dismissed. Indeed, as others have held, Al Nursa Front was " [u] nquestionably" a party to the NIAC in Syria. 135 Moreover, since that first case, the Belgian courts have in later cases made the even more striking, and indeed even more problematic, finding that ISIS did not qualify as an armed force engaged in conflicts in Syria or Iraq. In the Appeal Judgment of 26 January 2016, the Court of Appeal had already stated that the activities of the Sharia tribunal of ISIS could not be considered to constitute a 132 ibid, p. 54. The Antwerp Court of Appeal appears to have considered the alleged absence of disciplinary rules to enforce IHL very important, finding, inter alia, that the sharia courts cannot be considered as an internal disciplinary system. See ibid, pp 53-54: "De activiteiten van de shariarechtbank van ISIS kunnen niet beschouwd worden als een disciplinaire instantie die toezicht houdt op de te respecteren gedragsregels binnen de groep." and "M.b.t. Jahbat Al Nusra staat, op basis van de gegevens van het strafdossier, vast dat […] er geen disciplinaire gedragsregels kunnen afgedwongen worden om de noodzakelijke en fundamentele verplichtingen van het internationaal humanitair recht na te leven."). 133 As mentioned above, the ICTY referred to the factors only as "indicative" and its case law shows that not all factors need to be fulfilled for an armed group to be considered as organised. 134 The Antwerp Court of Appeal stressed that Al Nusra Front was part of the international terrorist network of Al Qaeda and was engaged in an armed struggle against all infidels, democracy, human rights and IHL (Appeal Judgment of 26 January 2016, pp 52 and 54: "Uit de elementen van het strafdossier blijkt genoegzaam dat Majlis Shura Al Mujahidin en Jabhat al Nusra beiden, behorende tot het internationaal terroristisch netwerk van Al Qaeda, een sektarische gewelddadige strijd voeren tegen de Sjiieten, ongelovigen, democratische waarden, mensenrechten en humanitair recht."). 135 disciplinary body aimed at ensuring respect for the "rules of behaviour" within the group. 136 Naturally, on the basis of both the facts on the grounds, as well as the clear expressions by the various States fighting ISIS in this regard, ISIS ought to have been considered (and continuous to be) a party to a series of armed conflicts. 137 In addition, it is worth recalling, as stressed by the ICRC, that "acts that are not prohibited by IHL -such as attacks against military objectives or against individuals not entitled to protection against direct attacks -should not be labelled 'terrorist' at the international or domestic levels". 138 Of course, the provision of the Belgian Criminal Code that excludes criminality in case the alleged conduct was "an act" (i.e. any act) of an armed force involved in an armed conflict may be partially to blame. Faced with this provision, the judges appear to have desired to limit the provision's effect, as it could lead to impunity, but in doing so -knowingly or perhaps unwittingly -misapplied IHL.
Exclusion clause
Article 141bis, the problematic provision of the Belgian Criminal Code, appears to be based on similar exclusion clauses contained in anti-terrorism treaties, aimed at excluding the conduct of government forces from their scope of application. A provision of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, for example, states that "[t]he activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by this Convention". 139 While the aforementioned provision is somewhat ambiguous, the phrase "which are governed by that law" appears intended to ensure that only those activities that are lawful under IHL fall under the exclusion clause and thus not considered as terrorism. However, the Belgian provision does not include such a specification and therefore any act by any armed force engaged as a party to an armed conflict would be excluded, both conduct lawful under IHL and acts that violate this body of laws.
The better way to address this issue in the cases concerning Al-Nusra Front and ISIS would have been for the Belgian judiciary to acknowledge that the exclusion clause was 
The PKK as a party to an armed conflict
In a more recent ruling, an investigative judge of the court in Brussels 142 found that as a result of Turkey and the PKK being engaged in a (non-international) armed conflict, the PKK did not fall under the Belgian terrorism legislation. 143 The judge concerned appears to have considered the PKK to be an organised armed group for the purposes of IHL, engaged in a non-international armed conflict; 144 which is, given the recent upsurge of fighting between the Turkish government forces and the PKK, a correct analysis, 145 and was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Brussels. 146 Whereas this ruling indicates that the Belgian courts'
understanding of the IHL concept of organised armed group, and hence of a party to a noninternational armed conflict, may be improving, the following discussion of this case shows that the judges still considered the wrong question in their analysis of the case.
In the appeal judgment of this case against 43 suspected members of the PKK and/or its armed wing the HPG, the Brussels Court of Appeal considered that -as a result of the exclusion clause contained in Article 141bis of the Belgian Criminal Code -the central question before it was whether the PKK is a terrorist organisation or an armed force involvement in an armed conflict, as defined by IHL and subject to the rules of IHL. 147 In other words, the Court of Appeal, as the other Belgian courts discussed above, considered qualifying as a terrorist organisation or as a party to an armed conflict to be mutually exclusive. 148 The Court of Appeal held that the lower judge had correctly found that the PKK was involved in a non-international armed conflict with Turkey. 149 To reach this conclusion, it analysed whether the factors identified by the ICTY for the existence of a non-international armed conflict were fulfilled. Most of the analysis considers relevant factors and its conclusion that the PKK was involved in a non-international armed conflict is certainly justified, 150 but the Court of Appeal also stressed that the PKK's goal was to establish an independent State, and not to instil severe fear in the civilian population. 151 Besides the fact that the (political) purpose of an armed group was explicitly found to be "irrelevant" in the very case law from which the Court of Appeal took the factors it applied for its analysis, 152 it must be noted that ISIS, which -as mentioned above -was found not to be a party to an armed conflict, as its name suggests, similarly strived to established an independent State.
The Brussels Court of Appeal did make a helpful clarification with regards the exclusion clause, noting that terrorist acts may occur during armed conflicts and that such acts are prohibited by IHL and punishable as war crimes, but do not fall on the Belgian domestic laws concerning terrorism. 153 It then proceeded, however, to juxtapose such a 147 "De vraag die zich stelt is of de PKK een terroristische organisatie is dan wel een strijdkracht bij een gewapend conflict, als gedefinieerd in en onderworpen aan het internationaal humanitair recht." ibid., p. 11. 148 Is shown above, this is an incorrect understanding of the law. 149 The judgment in first instance is not available, but the Appeal Judgment of 14 September 2017 indicates that the judge in first instance, on the basis of the facts available to him, concluded that during the period relevant to the charges, in Turkey an armed conflict for the purposes of IHL existed, between the PKK and Turkey (p. 10). 150 The Court of Appeal found that the PKK's struggle consisted of more than sporadic acts of violence and rather constituted protracted armed violence of certain intensity. It noted that the PKK had a strict hierarchy and that its armed wing (HPG) has a complex command structure, which includes a geographical division of command, and had a system in place to recruit and train new members. It further noted that the PKK and HPG expressed their commitment to abide by the prohibitions to use child soldiers and anti-personnel landmines, and had "courts" with public statutes, with the capability to enforcement IHL. In addition, the court noted that the PKK was financed pursuant to a very well-organised system, which includes the levying of taxes. Appeal Judgment of 14 September 2017, pp 14-16. 151 ibid., pp 16-17 ("Het doel van de PKK bestaat er niet in een bevolking ernstige vrees aan te jagen maar haar doelstelling is de oprichting van een onafhankelijke staat […]" and "De doelstelling van de PKK is […] de oprichting van een onafhankelijke staat doch niet het terroriseren van burgers.") 152 In Limaj, a case specifically referred to by the Court of Appeal in its judgment (see Appeal Judgment of 14 September 2017, p. 12), the ICTY found that "most importantly in the Chamber's view, the determination of the existence of an armed conflict is based solely on two criteria: the intensity of the conflict and organisation of the parties, the purpose of the armed forces to engage in acts of violence or also achieve some further objective is, therefore, irrelevant." ICTY, Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 30 November 2005, para. 170. 153 "Het is evenwel niet uitgesloten dat terroristische handelingen plaatsvinden in het kader van een gewapend conflict binnen het conflictgebied. Terroristische acties binnen het kader van een gewapend conflict zijn situation with that of "armed forces who are a party to an armed conflict" and commit acts of terrorism outside the conflict area, which it found not to constitute acts of armed forces "in the context of an armed conflict" and therefore subject to the domestic laws on terrorism. 154 This approach is not new, 155 or unreasonable, 156 so long as the Court of Appeal did not intend to say that acts by armed forces at a location that is geographically removed from the area of active hostilities by definition fall outside the scope of IHL and are not "in the context" of an armed conflict; as this would be incorrect.
To sum up, the most recent (publicly known) 157 Belgian ruling in relation to the notion of party to an armed conflict must be considered a step forward in terms of the correct application of IHL. However, some of the findings of the Brussel Court of Appeal remain cause for concern, especially for future cases involving situations that may -as opposed to the fight between the PKK and Turkey -be less traditional rebellions or insurgencies.
Concluding remarks
States do not like to be restricted in the way they can deal with armed opposition by non-State actors, including when it concerns alleged terrorist organisations. 158 As shown by the treatment of alleged terrorists in Guantanamo Bay and the use of so-called black sites, States may wish to rely on the alleged membership of such organisations as a reason to deny their rights under IHL. 159 Yet, the fact that an armed group is designated as a terrorist organisation, often for political reasons, does not preclude this entity from at the same time constituting a party to an armed conflict; and have rights and obligations as such.
The above discussion has shown that the number of situations in which terrorist organisations may qualify as parties to international armed conflicts is limited, but the possibility of such organisations to fulfill the criteria for being parties to non-international armed conflicts is very realistic, and indeed has been confirmed by various national and international courts. In such a case, the fighting by these organisations is governed by IHL and their members derive rights from and have obligations under this body of law. While they do not have combatant privilege in times of non-international armed conflicts, and IHL does not confer on them a 'right to kill', it is important to acknowledge that even if their participation in hostilities may violate domestic criminal law, it does not violate IHL. So long as they adhere to the rules of IHL, which includes limiting attacks to those performing a combatant-like function or taking a direct part in hostilities and against legitimate military objects, they do not commit any war crime.
Furthermore, as domestic law will generally provide sufficient options to prosecute members of alleged terrorist organisations, it is important that IHL is not (ab)used to achieve a conviction. Any domestic prosecutions should therefore be mindful of the framework and purpose of IHL. Incorrect pronouncements on the law risk distorting this body of law and the realism it is based on.
